Деятельность международных банков в Украине

Додаток А

ОГЛЯД ІНОЗЕМНОЇ ЛІТЕРАТУРИ АНГЛІЙСЬКОЮ МОВОЮ

1. Giannetti M., Ongena S. «Financial Integration and Entrepreneurial Activity: Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets», 2007. 33 p.

     This article is devoted to the study of Financial Integration and Entrepreneurial Activity in Emerging Markets. An extensive empirical literature has documented the positive growth effects of equity market liberalization. However, this line of research ignores the impact of financial integration on a category of firms crucial for economic development, i.e., the small entrepreneurial firms. This paper aims to fill this void. We employ a large panel containing almost 60,000 firm-year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European economies to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and financing. Foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and leverage, but the effect is dampened for small firms. We also find that the most connected businesses benefit least from foreign bank entry. This finding suggests that foreign banks can help mitigate connected lending problems and improve capital allocation.

2. Gadinis S., «The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation», Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2008. 34p.

     Policy coordination between diverse regulatory regimes in financial services ranks highly on the international political agenda, because regulatory differences create impediments to growing financial activity. Efficiency-oriented theories fail to explain why coordination was achieved in some domains but not in others, while arguments linking coordination to similarities or differences in states' substantive policy goals cannot account for coordination progress in spite of vast differences in prior domestic regimes. I argue that coordination success or failure depends on the interaction of two variables: whether strong competitors to U.S. firms and markets challenge U.S. dominance and whether activity is centralized at a main facility in a single jurisdiction, such as a stock exchange, or diffused around many separate jurisdictions. Strong U.S. dominance attracts more foreigners to U.S. centralized markets, who voluntarily adopt U.S. laws and lobby their governments for policy coordination; yet in dispersed markets, policy coordination offers limited benefits to either the United States or to foreign countries when U.S. dominance is strong. When a competitor challenges U.S. dominance in a centralized market, U.S. policymakers will maintain regulatory barriers to prevent U.S. investors from migrating to competitors. In dispersed markets, on the other hand, the United States will promote policy coordination because it can eliminate its competitors' advantages across all national markets. Four case studies in areas with varying degrees of U.S. dominance and market centralization support this theoretical framework: the accounting standards (U.S. GAAP-IFRS) convergence, the SEC's refusal to authorize the establishment of European exchanges' trading screens in the United States, the regulation of audit firms under the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the 1988 Basel Accord. This paper makes two contributions: it generalizes across cases to draw broad conclusions about the field of finance as a whole, and it highlights the role of politics in financial regulation, refining the concept of power, clarifying mechanisms, and providing a theory of how increased competition might shape diverse fields.

3. Phillips R., «Narrow Banking Reconsidered the Functional Approach to Financial Reform», Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2009., 144p.

     Ronnie J. Phillips presents the functional approach to reform for the financial system. This approach advocates the separation of the depository and lending functions of banks. As a result of the structural separation of banks' functions, monetary and credit policy undergo a parallel separation, and government supervision and regulation of the banking industry is modified. The policy prescription developed within this approach is narrow banking, the creation of separate monetary and financial service companies with the elimination of or substantial reduction in deposit insurance. Phillips asserts that narrow banking not only meets the safety and soundness goals of bank regulation, but also maintains an institutional structure that accommodates market forces and technological innovation. Phillips reviews the history of government involvement in the payments system. He traces the notion of backing demand deposits with federal government securities (a notion that is endorsed by the functional approach) to the early monetary system of the American colonies and to the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864. These acts guaranteed that the Treasury would redeem notes issued by national banks and backed by government bonds at par value. Although the currency was backed by government debt, it was not until the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 that the means of payment was backed by federal government debt. Two years later the Banking Act of 1935 created federal deposit insurance. The functional approach maintains that insurance dulls the incentives of depositors to seek a depository institution with sound assets and the incentives of depository institutions to maintain liquidity and high asset quality. Opposing this view are those who support fractional reserve banking, in which commercial banks hold central bank liabilities against their own liabilities. This approach contends that banks perform a valuable service through their dual functions of depository and lending activity and that this system yields efficiency gains because of information symmetries and the ability to hold minimal cash balances. Supporters of fractional reserve banking argue for reform through instituting risk-based pricing of deposit insurance, using subordinated debt to monitor banks' lending activities, having depositors pay fees for insurance, and increasing capital requirements. Narrow banking advocates argue that the microeconomic efficiency benefits of the fractional reserve banking reforms do not outweigh the macroeconomic costs. In the fractional reserve system the Federal Reserve is able to encourage credit restraint more easily than credit growth. In the functional system the Fed retains a significant role in monetary policy and a modified role in credit policy. One goal of the functional approach is to mitigate the influence of monetary policy on the credit market. Therefore, in its system monetary policy affects only those institutions, known as monetary service companies, holding liabilities backed by government debt. In other words, monetary policy is not simultaneously credit policy, as it is today. The portfolios of monetary service companies offering demand deposits would be restricted to only "safe" assets. The underlying assumption of the narrow bank policy is that the primary function of banks is to provide a payment mechanism. Phillips describes several narrow bank proposals that vary in their definitions of safe assets. However, as the interpretation of safe assets broadens, additional safety features are linked to the proposals. Complementing the monetary service companies are financial service companies, where savings are channeled to investors. Within this financial structure, financial holding companies may own both types of service companies, but the assets of the narrow bank remain separate from other financial units of the holding company. Establishing separate monetary and financial service companies enhances the safety of the payments system, improves the ability of the Fed to control monetary aggregates, reduces government regulation of banks, accommodates the growth of mutual funds, and eliminates or significantly reduces deposit insurance. Phillips discusses a number of issues raised by critics of narrow banking: the availability of safe assets and the corresponding maturities of these assets; the availability and cost of funds, especially for small businesses and consumers; access to the payments system; the shrinkage of the size of the banking system; the potential difficulty with overdrafts; foreign banking operations; and the political feasibility of the functional approach. Phillips recommends the adoption of two specific financial system reform proposals. first, he endorses the creation of monetary service companies that would serve strictly a payments function and would hold only safe assets, as prescribed by Robert E. Litan and James L. Pierce. Second, he recommends the proposal of James R. Barth and R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., that the federal government establish a mutual fund that holds only government securities as assets.

4. Wollmershaeuser T., Bofinger P., «Managed Floating: Understanding the New International Monetary Order», University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics, 2006., 57p.

     The article analyses New International Monetary Order. Although there seems to be a broad consensus among economists that purely floating or completely fixed exchange rates (the so-called corner solutions) are the only viable alternatives of exchange rate management, many countries do not behave according to this paradigm and adopt a strategy within the broad spectrum of exchange rate regimes that is limited by the two corner solutions. These intermediate regimes are characterized by significant foreign exchange market interventions of central banks and a certain degree of exchange rate flexibility. We develop a new empirical methodology that identifies three different forms of floating on the basis of a central bank's intervention activity: pure floating (no interventions), independent floating (exchange rate smoothing), and managed floating (exchange rate targeting). Our cross-country study shows that exchange rate targeting is at least as important as exchange rate smoothing. Subsequently we present a monetary policy framework in which central banks use the exchange rate as an operating target of monetary policy. We explain the mechanics of interventions and sterilization and we explain why a central bank has an interest in controlling simultaneously the exchange rate and the short-term interest rate. We derive the monetary policy rules for our two operating targets from a simple open economy macro model in which the uncovered interest parity condition and the Monetary Conditions Index play a central role.

5. Clarida R., Gali J., «A Simple Framework for International Monetary Policy Analysis», Queen Mary University of London, 2008., 44p.

     The article studies the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two-country sticky price model, where each country faces a short run tradeoff between output and inflation. The model is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, the policy problem for each central bank is isomorphic to the one it would face if it were a closed economy. Gains from cooperation arise, however, that stem from the impact of foreign economic activity on the domestic marginal cost of production. While under Nash central banks need only adjust the interest rate in response to domestic inflation, under cooperation they should respond to foreign inflation as well. In either scenario, flexible exchange rates are desirable.

6. Resta V., «What Future for the World Bank?», 2007., p96.

     The World Bank has shown an impressive ability to adapt to changing realities and transform itself during its more than sixty years of activity. Currently, however, it is facing an attack on the very legitimacy of its existence on various fronts.

     This paper will consider the main critiques facing the Bank, analyze whether these issues are enough to threaten the future of the Bank, and what the Bank is doing, or should be doing, to prevent this.

     The main critiques state that private sector flows to developing and transition countries are twenty times the size of transfers from the Bank and the other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) combined. The MDBs are being critiqued for crowding out private investment. NGOs consistently push for increased participation in the decision-making and monitoring processes of the Bank, as well as for increased Bank awareness of the environmental and social impacts of its projects. Debt relief by the Bank has been seen only as a 'cosmetic' change to appease NGOs without effecting real changes. The Bank is seen simply as an instrument of Western foreign policy. Loan conditionality is often seen as causing harm rather then preventing it. From a strategic standpoint, three main and interconnected themes are likely to define the future of the Bank: globalization, security, and reconstruction.

     It is the contention of this paper that the current critiques of the Bank do not by themselves spell its end. By offering its client countries both innovative financial mechanisms, tailor made for their specific needs and the technical support of its staff, and by managing to adapt its strategy to geopolitical realities, the Bank will continue to remain current, competitive, and absolutely necessary for the world of development. 
 

7. Nicola Cetorelli , «Risks in U.S. Bank International Exposures», Cornell University, 2007., 104p.

U.S. banks have substantial exposure to foreign markets such as Europe and Latin America. In this paper, we show how the amounts and forms of these exposures have evolved over time and note the changes in embodied risks taken through banks' cross-border activity, local claims, and derivative positions. Our findings vary with the type of U.S. bank. Compared with other banks, money-center banks tend to have a greater share of their assets in foreign exposures. Some of money-center banks' exposure to riskier countries, particularly Latin American countries, is achieved through the activities of local branches and subsidiaries that take on liabilities as well as assets, a strategy that reduces their bank transfer risk accordingly. As a share of total international exposures, the transfer risk assumed by money-center banks tends to be significantly lower than that of other banks.

8. Timothy A. Canova , «The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership», University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School, 2006., 89p.

     This article offers a critique of the deregulation of banking and finance that started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates during the Nixon administration, accelerated with interest rate deregulation during the Carter administration, and was deepened during the Reagan administration.

     Deregulation is seen as a changing of paradigms, from the New Deal regulatory model that limited price competition and channeled credit to socially useful purposes. The monetary and fiscal implications are significant. The regulatory model, particularly in its heyday, served to limit the authority of the Federal Reserve, neutralized monetary policy, and invigorated other policy tools to maintain price stability, especially in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. As a result, the elected branches of government were able to activate fiscal policy, thereby financing the World War Two effort, as well as the Cold War military buildup, the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe and Japan, and the G.I. Bill of Rights to educate and house returning U.S. war veterans.

     Particular emphasis is given to the distortions and inconsistencies in the deregulation model, including the resort to bailout of large financial institutions, such as U.S. commercial banks and savings and loans, as well as defaulting foreign nations. The irony of deregulation was that it led inevitably to a state of receivership and implicit subsidy for those with market and political power, while extracting rents from others.

     The Article concludes by proposing a return to a model of regulated competition that would be suited to a financial environment that is increasingly globalized. Any restoration of national sovereignty over monetary and fiscal policy would require multilateral mechanisms, tax and market incentives to limit the volume of destructive speculative activity. Canova offers one of the first discussions in a law journal of the proposed Tobin Tax, named after the late Nobel laureate, Dr. James Tobin.

9. Beck T., Maksimovic V. , «Bank Competition, Financing Obstacles, and Access to Credit», Goethe University Frankfurt, 2005., 76p.

     Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effects of bank concentration on access to external finance. Using a unique data base for 74 countries of financing obstacles and financing patterns for firms of small, medium, and large size, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic assess the effects of banking market structure on financing obstacles and the access of firms to bank finance. The authors find that bank concentration increases financing obstacles and decreases the likelihood of receiving bank finance, with the impact decreasing in size. The relation of bank concentration and financing obstacles is dampened in countries with well developed institutions, higher levels of economic and financial development, and a larger share of foreign-owned banks. The effect is exacerbated by more restrictions on banks' activities, more government interference in the banking sector, and a larger share of government-owned banks. Finally, it is possible to alleviate the negative impact of bank concentration on access to finance by reducing activity restrictions.

10. Alexei Karas , Koen J. L. Schoors , «Are Private Banks More Efficient than Public Banks? Evidence from Russia», 2008.

     In this article I find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and - surprisingly - that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences, the bank's activity mix or size, or the econometric approach. The evidence in fact suggests that domestic public banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and that the efficiency gap between these two ownership types did not narrow after the introduction of deposit insurance in 2004. This may be due to increased switching costs or to the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.

      Додаток Б 

     Анотація  магістерської дипломної  роботи (англійською  мовою) 

     Diploma work is devoted to the study of the work of international banks in Ukraine in light of current global financial crisis. In the first chapter the author analyses theoretical aspects of international banking activities and work of international organizations as regards regulation of this business. He also describes prospective models of the ‘New International Monetary and Banking Order’. Modern development of the international banking system status was reflected in the second section. Influence, reasons and consequences of world financial crisis, and directions of reformation and proper measures, is described for overcoming of crisis. Considerable attention was spared foreign jars which have the representative offices in Ukraine. In a final chapter attention the modern  state and legal adjusting was spared and functioning of foreign banks in Ukraine. Considerable attention was spared the question of bank market development in Ukraine and influence of modern financial crisis on activity of foreign banks. On an end the prospects of bank business were considered in Ukraine. What negative and positive sides a foreign bank capital has on the banking system of Ukraine.