Independence Kazakhstan

Verny had only one gymnasium. Now in Almaty there are 185 schools of general education, a lot of technical secondary schools and Universities. Almaty is a University city. Young people from different places og Kazakhstan come to study here. 

Almaty is situated at the food of the Ala-Tau montains. The climate is very favourable for gardening. Everybody in kazakstan knows the world famous apples "aport". The citizens of Almaty are proud of the well known skating-rink "Medeo". It is equipped with all modern sport facilities. The most important competition are held there. 

Almaty is the city of kind and hospitable people. It is a great pleasure to visit it. 

Список литературы 

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Kazakhstan – 20 Years After Independence 

by michaelhancock on 9/25/2011 · 4 comments

Prologue 

Kazakhstan twenty years into its first independent statehood is a difficult animal to categorize, describe, analyze, etc. Why would we want to? My aim in this exercise is to find a general sense of how Kazakhstan has changed since the late 1980s and how it has stayed the same. I am treating the year of Independence (1991) more as a shift than a stopping or breaking point. For that reason, I’ll start this article a little behind independence, in the 1980s of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. 

The Brezhnev era, lasting into the early 1980s, had seen Central Asia become even more semi-feudal than before, with leaders cemented at various levels by cronyism replacing any form of Leninist (Stalinist?) meritocracy that may have once existed (if ever). The massive, violent riots of December 1986 when a Russian was named First Party Secretary shocked the leadership and the populace – what is this thing called ethnicity in a Soviet, post-ethnic state? Some suggested that the riots, since named the Zheltoqsan Riots (December in Kazakh), were pushed at the time by ex-Secretary Kunaev, out of power after 27 years in the top position. Kunaev had gained massive authority and had come to symbolize for Moscow everything that was corrupt and broken about the Brezhnev era… but his replacement with a Russian who had never lived in Kazakhstan before was not regarded as a breath of fresh air but as a slap in the face. The Uzbek SSR had a similar personage – Sharof Rashidov – who did not long outlive the Brezhnev era. In 1990, Nazarbayev himself was implicated in criminal activities connected to the riots – though nothing came of the report. 

The riots, even if only a product of political maneuvering by elites, had very real and lasting political side-effects for those not in power. Olzhas Suleimenov, poet and activist, used the momentum of these protests to help create and drive the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-proliferation/testing treating. The native language movement grew in power and the Republic of Kazakhstan’s status as the only ‘minority’ ethnicity (ethnic Kazakhs were less than fifty percent of the population) became not only a fact of life but a situation to be confronted and reversed as soon as possible. This was remarkable, as the last Soviet census showed one of the successes of the Soviet nationality experiment (of creating Soviets instead of Russians, Kazakhs, etc.) – the Kazakhs had the largest population outside of the Central Asian Republics while still within the USSR (8% of all Kazakhs in the Soviet Union lived outside of Soviet Central Asia, while the other nationalities had between 1 and 2% outside the region). The willingness of Kazakhs to leave their “homeland” would later be condemned by nationalists, yet it speaks to the success of the Soviet Union in creating its own ‘national identity.’ 

In 1989, the Soviet Union was in the process of reinvention, restructuring, and rehabilitating itself. Nursultan Nazarbayev had just come to power to lead the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic. Since Independence, there has been a strong push in Western academia to understand “clan” and “clan politics.”  Some have sought to define Nazarbayev’s rise to power as the appropriation of clan linkages. However, this would seem to beg the question –  whether or not an independent Kazakhstan is a continuation of a Soviet (i.e. Russian/Communist created) state. Also, there is certainly room to argue that Nazarbayev’s rise was not related to the ill-defined mechanism of clan, but was rather the same kind of cronyism, nepotism, and corruption found in leadership throughout the Soviet Union, including those states without a history of nomadism and clan political structures. (This would be an excellent place to jump into the discussion of what we mean by clan in the first place and whether one can find a history of ‘clan’ politics in the Kazakh population prior to 1900) 

Similarly, much has been made of the dominance of descendants of the Middle Horde in Kazakhstan today. While much of this is a simple question of population, there is also the fact that many historical Kazakhs of the other two hordes fled the lands now encompassed by Kazakhstan for points north, east, and south. Similarly, the fact that the geographic region of the Middle Horde included the industrialized sections of Kazakhstan, it is rather difficult (chicken versus the egg) to prove that clan politics caused anything. Regarding Nazarbayev personally, he married a co-worker and married his daughters with legal regard for clan connections. Some point to the supposed noble lineage of Mrs. Nazarbayev, while others have explained how one must marry outside the clan in traditional Kazakh society. In short, I am following the conclusions of Jonathan Murphy who, after an in-depth study of modern Kazakhstan’s clan affiliations, came to understand that there was little that couldn’t be explained in simpler terms, those with which the student of Communist power is already familiar.

1991 – Independence. Independence! Independence? 

The coup of August was an unpleasant surprise to the leaders of the Republics, though at least the Kyrgyz Republic’s new ‘democratic’ leader looked on in favor. However, Moscow did not give up the ghost and the separate republics did not start on their respective “Independence Days” as newly minted countries fully in control of their trade, currencies, academies, police forces, etc. For example, throughout 1991 Nazarbayev spoke on many occasions in support of the changes needed in the Soviet Union along similar lines to the rhetoric of Gorbachev – market reforms and economic restructuring. Specifically important was the sovereignty of Kazakhstan with regard to its mineral rights, as Gorbachev had recently kept Kazakhstan in the dark during Moscow’s agreement with Chevron to develop the Tengiz oilfields. When Nazarbayev was popularly elected (albeit amongst the now-familiar cries of election malpractice) on December 1, 1991, it was not to an independent country. But a week later, the USSR was effectively annulled by the new CIS, which the Central Asian States requested to join as founding members. There has been some discussion over the racial slur implied by the Slavic definition of the initial CIS (the first meeting was held by leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) which Nazarbayev has helped salve by announcing publicly that he was invited to the first meeting but refused, not having had time to read the necessary documents. 

The date of the foundation of the CIS, now a relatively weak and meaningless political union, is the true Independence Day of all of the resulting independent states of Central Asia. It was a shock and an unforeseen turn of events to which each country and its leaders reacted differently. It is not by accident that Kazakhstan declared independence on the fifth anniversary of the Zheltoqsan Riots. 

While it began its existence like the other Central Asian Republics with abandonment by the parent state that had created  and nourished its infrastructures, intelligentsia, histories, and political ideologies, Kazakhstan undoubtedly had the greatest economic potential, not only in mineral, but also agricultural wealth. However, Western analysts assumed that this would be difficult to capitalize and instead looked to Uzbekistan to lead the way, based on their own assumptions of the potential for ethnic unrest in the region. Kazakhstan was doomed to failure because of its tensions between the minority Kazakhs and the large population of Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Cossacks. This was not idle speculation, considering September of 1991 saw the four hundredth anniversary of Uralsk’s founding, celebrated by saber-rattling Cossack re-enactments.

The 1990s – the new Kazakhstan, the new Kazakhs 

The safety net, the welfare state, the infrastructure of state control – all gone or going. The 1990s proved to be a formative era in the creation of independent Kazakhstan, providing a time of troubles, a baptism-by-fire for its early economic heroes and anti-heroes. In those days, fortunes disappeared, securities and retirements became worthless promises, and simple day-to-day necessities disappeared, some yet to return, particularly outside of the urban centers of population. The corruption that had brought down the Soviet Union would help to create a new kind of state – one based on client-patron connections. Again, I would suggest it is problematic to claim that this is somehow unique or distinctive of Kazakhstan. While one can look to the film Racketeer as evidence of the ‘wild West’ of 1990s Kazakhstan, it itself is derivative of similar gangster films based on 1990s Russia. This dark past of the so-called New Kazakhs, again the analog to the New Russians, is integral to understanding their role in society and their perceptions among the less affluent (possibly less cut-throat?) majority percentage of the population. 

I would like to speak to the issue of Kazakhstan’s existence as a state, separate from the existence of the Kazakhs as a nation. Whatever we might all think about the ethnic/national identities in Central Asia, there is a political reality in the presence worthy of our attention. There are five states and over a hundred ethnic groups living within the confines of the former Soviet Middle Asia and Kazakhstan. This article is not going to go into history except to say that, like in all other areas of the world with which I am familiar, history has been the manipulative (and manipulated) tool of the political forces in power. In the case of the Soviet Union, there was a drive to show how the nomadic history of the Kazakhs must give way to the centralized power of a settled people. This is still true today, as many sources (Western and indigenous) have suggested that the ex-Soviet Turkic and Muslim populations of Central Asia are not ready for stable, democratic government. The Soviet era saw historians reaching back to feudal models and post-Mongol ages for the source of Kazakh identity, but with independence has come a strong push further into the fog of history for Kazakh-ness, looking to the Saka/Scythians and the riches of the Golden Man (or Golden Woman). 

In this way, Kazakhstan is easy to compare with the other modern Central Asian countries. They have all shared in the successful creation of new identities thanks to the Soviet Union and its focus on ‘scientific’ history, education, literacy and ethnography. This leads some citizens of Kazakhstan to speak of the past as being first and foremost connected to the present. As anachronistically as a modern American citizen might say, “We declared independence in 1776,” without defining the pronoun, so might a citizen of Kazakhstan say, “We used to have blonde hair and blue eyes and dress our leaders in gold.”

The 2000s and Beyond 

By the time I became intimately familiar with Kazakhstan in 2005, the country had completed much of its own construction of the political and bureaucratic infrastructure that exists today. Building off of the systems and agencies it inherited from the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has emerged as a country deeply changed by independence in only a few aspects of life. Russia to the north and Uzbekistan to the south offer elements for comparison, yet it’s difficult to prove which differences are caused by environmental (non-human, non-artificial) concerns and which by differences in political ideology. Kazakhstan had much less of the “change and reform” rhetoric implemented by Karimov in the 1990s, yet in many ways has had a far more dynamic and successful transition from Soviet models than any of the other Central Asian republics. Again, though, I would hesitate to suggest this is not directly related to Kazakhstan’s own mineral and agricultural wealth in comparison with that of Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The fact that the ethnic tensions of Kazakhstan never caused a deeper rift may be not unrelated to this topic of economic wealth – the most peaceful multi-ethnic states are also the most affluent. 

From my own experience in Uzbekistan in 2005, I can speak to personally hearing the city of Shymkent (or Chimkent, in Uzbek language) spoken of in lavish terms, being the city of market and commercial possibilities a short drive north of Uzbekistan’s much larger city and capital of Tashkent. Shymkent remains “wild”  for many of Kazakhstan’s citizens, yet its economic successes and rise in power are undeniable, even to those who find it unsavory. Taraz, Taldykorgan, Aktobe, Atyrau – to name but a few – have all grown enormously in wealth and development since the 1980s. At that time, one might have mistaken downtown Navoiy or Angren in the Uzbek SSR with Atyrau or Aktobe. That is to say, those cities created and settled largely during the Soviet regime. Other, older cities of Kazakhstan that survived with large indigenous populations have remained the least changed – Turkestan, the ‘old town’ inside Shymkent, and my own ‘second home’ of Sayram. These are the cities that also have shown the most difficult with regards to seamlessly merging them with the post-independence version of Kazakhstan’s history. 

This retrospective is united by a common thread – the power of Nursultan Nazarbayev. Has the President and Father of Kazakhstan created something sustainable? I have no idea, but many opinions. It seems likely that as long as Kazakhstan maintains its economic potential, it will retain its political and other advantages over its neighbors to the south. At the same, its northern and eastern neighbors of power are likely to grow their own investments and interests in the region. I will not be surprised if a future president of Kazakhstan is as fluent in Chinese as he is in Russian and Kazakh. I will be surprised if that person is not male and not Kazakh. 

Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan. 20 years later.

Friday, April 1, 2011 - 11:20 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union five independent states which embarked on democratization formed in Central Asia. Presidential republics, ruled by the permanent presidents (except Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) were established there. Twenty years later we can speak about certain results of the development of these countries. So what was achieved by these young states? Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a leader in Central Asia, the president of the country repeatedly put forward the idea of creating "United Central Asia", which received no support. Today Kazakhstan is certainly ahead of the rest of the region by many indicators, some experts see the effect of energy potential of the country. When studying this topic, we face very conflicting opinions: a flurry of flattering articles in the Kazakh media, or publications that sling mud at the president and his family. Who is Nursultan Nazarbayev, and what is his role in the history of the Republic of Kazakhstan?

In Soviet times, the economy of the Kazakh SSR took the fifth place in the national economic ranking of Soviet republics. But in 2008, i.e. before the global financial crisis, gross domestic product (GDP) of the Republic of Kazakhstan in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) amounted 167.6 billion U.S. dollars and allowed the country to become the 54th economy in the world. Kazakhstan's GDP per capita at PPP was 7,440 U.S. dollars and allowed it to take 79th place in the world ranking in terms of life, being ahead of many other former Soviet republics.

Many analysts noted the difficult situation that was faced by post-Soviet countries, where it was necessary to determine the fate of the latter-day nations. It was very important to have strong-willed leadership. So Nazarbayev instead of the vice-presidency or premiership of the Soviet Union remained the head of the state, where the basis of the economy is a resource sector with almost complete absence of enterprises with a full cycle of processing. In addition, most people did not consider Kazakhstan to be their home and had a migratory mood, so by the beginning of 1990s the Kazakhs were only 45% of the total population. Another factor is that in the domestic life remained a small-town and totally unprepared elite. Finally, there was uncontrolled nuclear weapon in the country.

Of course, after the collapse of Soviet Union the position of Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics began to deteriorate in all spheres of life. This is explained by the fact that the USSR was a complex system of interconnected states that supplemented and supported each other. According to the predictions, Kazakhstan had to turn into a raw material appendage of Russia, or it would have had a long strip of instability and transformation into a source of ethnic and religious conflicts. Successes on the economic front, and they were obviously played a key role in enhancing the popularity of Nazarbayev. However, according to opponents, a jump in world prices for energy resources simply played into the hands of the president.

Another reason for critics of Nazarbayev was the fact that he attracted foreign investment and transferred the industry in the hands of foreigners. He was accused of excessive concentration of economic resources in the hands of one person.

But the concentration of economic management in the hands of state leaders in the early 1990s was the only possible method to fight the economic crisis. It is necessary to take into account the fact that Kazakhstan had industrial enterprises, but it did not have its own economy. The Kazakh state leadership, politicians and businessmen had to learn self-management and development.

What is the image of Nazarbayev as a political player? The former Soviet Union he is considered to be heavyweight, who has no match in political maneuvering. Back in the late 1990's - early 2000's, using noble slogans against corruption and incompetence, he beat the last competitors remaining on the domestic political scene, among which was the former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin.

Eliminating political opponents, subjecting them to persecution, Nazarbayev has been ruling the country for twenty years. Today the Kazakh public is more and more worried about the future of the country; there is no mechanism for peaceful transfer of power. Several times there were constitutional amendments that limit the next president. Experts are wondering what caused such amendments, and foreshadow the departure of the President out of the Policy. But it is believed that this illustrative progress toward the democracy was taken in anticipation of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the OSCE. Indeed, in the west the rule of Nazarbayev was considered dictatorial, though people noted his achievements.

The power is the thing that Nazarbayev always loved. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, this working-metallurgist, born in 1940, showed an innate talent for the struggle for influence in the ranks of the Communist Party. He managed to rise to the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and later to become the leader of the state formed in 1991.

The final result of his work is quite impressive: after almost a decade he strengthened the Kazakh language in the country during the Soviet period with most Russian-speaking people; he built a new capital Astana in the desert; he closed the nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk; he fired hundreds of thousands of civil servants; he attracted foreign investors and with their help he developed oil and gas mining and was not afraid to enrage international companies with the demands to pay more taxes.

Activities of Nazarbayev in the international arena in general deserve sincere admiration. In the present situation, when almost all other republics of the former Soviet Union managed to spoil their relations, Kazakhstan maintains the established contacts and finds new allies. According to the expert Temirgaliev, "Kazakhstan depends on U.S. policy and Russia less than all the rest. Nazarbayev didn’t let turn the country into an arena of open geopolitical confrontation of modern superpowers. And such picture we see now in Georgia and Ukraine."

In connection with the global crisis Kazakhstan had some economic problems that exacerbated the situation in the country. Despite the fact that consolidating authority had positive results at the initial stage, today it was developed into authoritarian rule with "sultanistic" bias, and the country suffers a lot from the domination of the family and the inner circle of the president. At the beginning of his reign, the clan structure of society didn’t not carry such a large number of problems due to the balancing of the president between the interests of juz’ and the establishment of the spheres of influence. But today there is no unity even within the family of the president, which is because of the prospect of a successor choosing.

There were a lot of scandals associated with Nazarbayev during the entire period of his reign. Population complains about the flowering corruption. Nazarbayev himself acknowledges that bribery became widespread. Meanwhile, in federal court of New York slowly continues the hearing of the case of “Kazakhgate” against a former adviser of Nazarbayev, the U.S. businessman James Giffen, who is accused of transferring millions of bribes to the accounts of Kazakh leaders of the highest rank.

A dark story about the deaths of two opposition leaders: Zamanbek Nurkadilov in 2005 and Altynbek Sarsenbayuly in 2006 negatively influenced the image of Nazarbayev. The official version of the causes of their deaths didn’t not convince people that the investigation really got to the truth.

One of the most serious scandals was associated with the former in-law of Kazakh president Rahat Aliyev, who was condemned at home in 2007. He began to reveal the secrets of the family and the presidency. According to Aliyev, Nazarbayev appropriated billions of dollars from state treasury and for a long time he charged a personal rent from the companies that do business in Kazakhstan. If to take into account that Aliyev was once a deputy head of the National Security Committee (KSC), his revelations should not be treated as a newspaper canard. According to Aliyev, the President of Kazakhstan doesn’t only receive a bribe from the largest Kazakh companies, but also he secretly owns shares in the copper, uranium, oil and gas industry, as well as a network of offshore bank accounts.

This year, the Parliament of Kazakhstan sent a proposal to the president to assign him the title "the leader of the nation." This bill provides immunity of the president and his family after the day when Nazarbayev leaves the office. According to the famous human rights activist Sergei Utkin, "all are equal before the law and the court – we can’t put a point on this. President is a citizen like all of us." But we talk about the complete exclusion of liability of the president and members of his family for any actions. As a lawyer I can say that in this case, no legal provisions for Mr. Nazarbayev and his relatives will be covered - neither the Constitution nor the laws. The irresponsibility is terrible. And even without this law the family of the President behaves as they want. And then it can be cancelled, so there is no expediency in this venture. "