Тибетский вопрос

         Buddhism flourished in Tibet in the seventh century. Receiving royal patronage, it spread throughout Tibet. With the assumption of power by the Dalai Lamas from 1642 onwards, the era of "harmonious blend of religion and politics" was established in Tibet. Since then, for three-and-a-half centuries, ten successive Dalai Lamas have been the spiritual and temporal rulers of Tibet.

         Monasteries, temples, and hermitages were founded in every village and town throughout Tibet, together with resident monks and, as the case may be, nuns. Every Tibetan Buddhist home had its altar. Huge monasteries, which were more like monastic cities, such as Drepung, Sera, and Gaden in Lhasa, Tashilhunpo in Shigatse, Sakya Monastery in Sakya, Tsurphu in central Tibet, Mindroling in central Tibet, Tashi-kyil in Amdo Labrang, Gaden Jampaling in Chamdo, Lithang Gonchen, etc, became high seats of learning.

         Monasteries, temples and hermitages were found in every village and town throughout Tibet. By 1959, there were a total of 6,259 monasteries and temples with about 592,558 resident monks and nuns.

        Soon after their invasion of Tibet, the Chinese authorities began to undermine the traditional social system and religion of Tibet. «Religion is the enemy of our materialist ideology and believing in religion is blind faith. Therefore, you should not only not have faith in religion, but should also condemn it, » people were told. By the middle of the fifties, monasteries, temples, and cultural centres were systematically looted and destroyed-in eastern Tibet. The physical desecration and destruction was accompanied by public condemnation of religion and humiliation and ridicule of religious persons.

         Contrary to official Chinese assertions, much of Tibet's culture and religion was destroyed between 1955 and 1961, and not during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) alone. By 1976 only eight monasteries and nunneries had escaped Chinese destructions.¹²

          Since 1979, some superficial religious freedom was allowed. This included selective renovation of places of worship and allowing people to indulge in rituals like prostrations, circumambulations, etc. But the propagation of the teachings of the Buddha is discouraged and strictly controlled. The essence of Buddhism lies in mental and spiritual development achieved through intensive study with qualified lamas, understanding and practice. But the Chinese authorities discourage this in their campaign to misrepresent Tibetan religion.

          Contrary to Chinese claims, most of the renovation work of the places of worship, including the "state-sponsored" ones, came through the initiative of the Tibetan public who contributed their labor and money. The assistance given by the Chinese government only forms a fraction of the total costs.

         The Chinese authorities, even now, do not let the functioning units of the monastic universities to continue their traditional religious practices. Admission to monasteries are controlled, number of monks limited and political indoctrination is undertaken in the monasteries. The management of monasteries is placed in the hands of a maze of state bureaucracies.

           Though China no longer bombs or sends Red Guards to destroy Tibet's monasteries, its aim still remains the same as before: total elimination of Tibetan religion and culture.

 

2.3. Possible future of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR)

          Since the question here is whether China and the CTA can actually agree on a deal, it is relevant to do a thought experiment and see how Tibet might look like in the future if for example the MWA got accepted and the CTA would end up being partly autonomous, as the MWA clearly states. It is very conceivable that if that was to happen, the PRC would no longer support Tibet financially in any meaningful manner or no longer finance development of Tibet. Knowing from especially the sources supporting the PRC, Tibet was previously a region with high poverty until China came and changed that. We also know that the GDP of Tibet was significantly smaller in Tibet earlier and have in fact changed much in the recent times after the liberation of Tibet. Tibet cannot have it both ways; both be independent of China and, as well, receive support from the PRC. Even if they did, there is no reason why the PRC would continue to support Tibet in as high a manner, as they are doing now while Tibet is under China. In other words, if Tibet was to become independent of China indications are that it would have a hard time financing itself, consequently being diminished to the state of poverty that it was in before. Of course this is a pessimistic picture drawn on the possible future scenario of Tibet, if it was to achieve the independence that the CTA and some of the Tibetans long for. The other side of it, a more positive scenario, is that Tibet would succeed in building industry around many of the resources that it currently has. If this was the case, Tibet might effectively be able to make use of many of its resources, export it efficiently and export it aptly. However, to reach that point from a lower state of poverty is a hard thing to do and it is something that Tibet need help in order to do. A positive outcome of the situation then, and as we have previously indicated, a likely one as well, would be with the help of China. I mentioned here that China would most likely not continue to develop Tibet, as it is doing currently. However, earlier in the thesis I also state that China would be interested in the resources found in the Tibetan region. Taking the obvious assumption that China need and want the resources of Tibet in order to continue on its own rise and in order to continue development and trade of its own state, it is highly imaginable that on the brink of China allowing the CTA to be the new Tibetan administration, it would make sure that it (China) had special agreements with the new administration in Tibet. In other words, if Tibet were to reach independence China would make sure to have special privileges and special access to the resources of Tibet. Obviously a deal such as this has to go both ways and be mutually beneficial, and benefits to Tibet will in this scenario exist. These are benefits such as perhaps continuous support, help in building an efficient industry and perhaps business management. In an agreement such as this, China would indeed have incentives to support Tibet after a break up, since there would now be power relational benefits in it for China in the form of special trade agreements and special access to goods.¹³

       A possible hypothesis in this outcome is that the statement from Goldstein, that the acculturation of Tibet would be the case. I am not saying, though, that the traditional culture of Tibet would disappear completely, but more that the development of Tibet together with the massive movement of Han Chinese into Tibet would diminish it to a point where it would not pose a threat to the PRC in terms of an opposition to the PRC per se. Accepting that the hypothesis of Goldstein is in fact similar to the actual strategy of the PRC or that the consequence would be same as if it was, due to the movement of Han Chinese to Tibet in order to possess jobs, I believe it is plausible that the demonstrations and self-immolations in Tibet would diminish. In conjunction with this hypothesis, I have stated that the Dalai Lama is important for both state entities in reaching an agreement, because for the PRC he is the only legitimate authority figure. The CTA is not an authority in the eyes of the PRC because it is an illegitimate government and not one worth much attention when it does not go through the Dalai Lama first. It has been stated, however, that the Dalai Lama has retired. With this in mind, together with the obvious fact that the spiritual leader might not live forever, the CTA would lastly remain. The CTA nevertheless, does not hold much respect in the view of the PRC and the PRC would with great likelihood not be willing to negotiate with the CTA due to how it see the nature of the CTA to be, which is as a  separatist pseudo government prone to terrorism. I then believe that in this scenario, the power of the CTA is likely to diminish and the Tibet question would become less of a question.¹⁴

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

              I have throughout the thesis explained why the CTA and China do and did as they did and what reasons they may have had for it, their incentives and made several hypotheses out of the relevant data. The question of whether or not the CTA and China can reach an agreement is one that we can now attempt to answer.

         The short answer is that they might be able to reach an agreement that they would both gain from, but that it is not that likely it will actually happen. According to the theoretical frameworks, China will not let go of the regions outside of Tibet, that Tibet wish to have as part of Tibet when/if they gained independence. I have concluded that if the CTA was to become the new administration in Tibet it would be through  the  MWA. In other words, it would be the MWA that the PRC would agree too. I argued that this approach to an agreement is the one in which China would lose the least power overall, but would still be able to have benefits from Tibet in the form of its resources and China would be able to still call Tibet part of China, and therefore not lose any integrity, due to the fact that nature of the MWA is such that Tibet does not gain complete, but only partial autonomy. I will therefore deduce that the MWA solution is the most likely solution to be realized. It is the most likely solution that both parties would agree to. However, there is an “if”. The solution would only be accepted by the PRC, and by that be realized if and only if, the Dalai Lama and the CTA changed the nature of their proposal. They would have to change the MWA so that it does not include the parts outside of Tibet, e.g. Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Ningxia as parts that they claim to want. If they changed their mind in terms of gaining that territory, the  MWA would be the most likely solution, but only if they did that.

      We can see that China’s policy is tight and focused on integration and absorption autonomous regions. The same expansive economic and demographic policy is conducted for Central- Asia republics, especially Kyrgyzstan.

      China has common history with Central Asia. In distant past, China was linked through silk route with Kyrgyzstan and entire trade with Europe, and other regions was conducted through silk route. When Islam entered in the lives of Central Asian people the whole central Asia came under Muslim rule. In those days the region was called Turkistan and also included the area which is now a province of china, in the name of Xingjian, therefore ancient ethnic and religious links exist between China and Central Asian States. Due to common borders with Kyrgyzstan spread over 100 miles the in habitants on both sides remain in close contact.

       In the present circumstances, the role of china may remain unpredictable but it is most probable that China will be most important player in Kyrgyzstan in future. Since the independence of  Kyrgyzstan in 1991 China has built close bilateral trade and investment connections to create and increase its sphere of influence.

        So, to avoid the same problem as Tibet in future, Kyrgyzstan has to raise own economy and aim to be subject of own foreign and domestic policy, not to be an object of political influence of China and other strong power.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abbreviation List

 

CTA – Central Tibetan Administration

IGO – Intergovernmental Organisation

IR – International Relations

PRC – People’s Republic of China

MWA – Middle Way Approach

TAR – Tibet Autonomous Region

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

1. Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: “The Globalization of World Politics – an Introduction to International Relations”; Oxford University Press; New York; 2006.
2. Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010.
3. Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East GateBook; United States of America; 2006.
4. He, Baogang: “The Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Proposal – A one-Sided Wish?” “, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June;
5. Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.
6. Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009.
7. Mearsheimer, John J: “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”; University of Chicago, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York; 2001.
8. Smith Jr., Warren W.: “China’s Tibet? – Autonomy or Assimilation”; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; United States of America; 2008.
9. John K. Fairbank: ”China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No.3, (Apr., 1969)
10. Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June: “Introduction – the Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective”, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.
11. Teufel Dreyer, June: “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China“, in Sautman, Barry in Teufel Dreyer, June; Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.

¹ Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009. – P. 32

² Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006.- P. 12

³ He, Baogang: “The Dalai Lama’s Autonomy Proposal – A one-Sided Wish?” “, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June 2011. – P. 23

⁴ Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East GateBook; United States of America; 2006. – P. 45

⁵ Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010. – P.87

⁶ Mearsheimer, John J: “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”; University of Chicago, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York; 2001. – P. 39

⁷ Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: “The Globalization of World Politics – an Introduction to International Relations”; Oxford University Press; New York; 2006.- P.91

⁸ Smith Jr., Warren W.: “China’s Tibet? – Autonomy or Assimilation”; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; United States of America; 2008. – P. 45

⁹ John K. Fairbank: ”China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No.3, (Apr., 1969). – P. 27

¹⁰ Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June: “Introduction – the Tibet Question in Contemporary Perspective”, in Sautman, Barry and Teufel Dreyer, June; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 56

¹¹ Teufel Dreyer, June: “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of China“, in Sautman, Barry in Teufel Dreyer, June; Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 38

¹² Contemporary Tibet – Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region; An East Gate Book; United States of America; 2006. – P. 48

¹³ Jacques, Martin: When China Rules the World – the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World; Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books; England; 2009. – P. 76

¹⁴ Blouet, Brian W.: “Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century – Second Revised and Expanded Edition”; Reaktion Books; London; 2010. – P. 95